2 especially as contagious disorders, even if they took root in slum quarters, posed risks to the wealthy.
A Sanitarian or hygienic movement emerged that attended to what could be done to reduce the risks of exposure to filth or other harmful influences or to strengthen individual constitutions to make them better able to resist ill health. Strengthening constitutions might be achieved by looking to the quality of food and this led to campaigns against the adulteration of food and in favour of temperance. This movement developed into what is mostly called Public Health Medicine but occasionally, when poverty is substituted for filth, Social Medicine.
The laboratory became the location where biomedical developments happened.
Generating and mapping numbers, epidemiology, was the main tool of public health.
Where traditional medicine aimed at curing patients, public health aimed at preventing disease, something its proponents argued was more cost-effective. The social side of medicine can legitimately claim to be progressive; there is a less legitimate implication here that the other side is not as progressive. The public health mavens have railed against biological reductionism, an idea that everybody seemingly 3 3 "gets". They have more recently championed a biopsychosocial approach to medicine that appears to be the height of reasonableness.
Biomedicine from this perspective has been linked to a biological determinism. In the nineteenth century, this had its clearest expression in psychiatry in the concept of degeneracy, a concept with racist and supremacist overtones that for some found their ultimate expression in the gas chambers of the Final Solution.
The biomedical camp has had corresponding concerns about social medicine, but these have had less traction. Early in the nineteenth century, there was resistance to the adoption of numerical methods, from those who believed that medicine cannot be practised by numbers -that the duty of the doctor is to the patient in front of her rather than to the population.
In the 1880's, the development of bacteriology in the hands of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch led to a bitter dispute between the Hygienists championed by Max von Pettenkoffer and Koch. This seemed to be settled in favour of biological reductionism with the success of Emil Behring's development of diphtheria antitoxin.
The bitterness suggests an underlying fault line. Camps built up on both sides with social scientists on the one side and biologists on the other, few of whom had a background in clinical practice. And while we can see genetic determinism on the biomedical side, it is also possible to show that the public health imperative to prevent disorder underpinned the development of a eugenic movement in the early twentieth century, compulsory vaccination programs in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, and in the late 
Industry
Both biomedical and public health approaches to medicine have been laid the basis for huge industrial complexes. The development of bacteriology clarified some environmental influences and how better to avoid exposure to them. It also underpinned the development of analgesics and antipyretics and later antibiotics and these medicines laid the basis for the growth of the modern pharmaceutical industry.
One of the most potent symbols of the emergence of the pharmaceutical industry was Behring's patenting of diphtheria antitoxin in the late 1890's, a move that scandalized many doctors especially in the United States, who were affronted at the idea of profiting from the cure of diseases. The problem was compounded when Behring was awarded the first Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1901.
The emergence of magic bullets as a way to solve problems pushed the locus of responsibility back on the individual. There are clear political consequences of developments that reduce the pressure to change the environment.
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Public health, on the other hand, was from the very start, underpinned by an insurance industry that took shape in the eighteenth century, and the interests of this industry to manage risks laid the basis for epidemiology and an attention to numbers in health.
The hygienists, in turn, advocated strongly for pensions as a public health measure, which furthered the growth of insurance, and ultimately healthcare today is delivered through insurance schemes of one sort or the other.
In the nineteenth century, therefore, the biomedical sciences and public health movement supported the growth of the economy, and both are critical to the modern economy.
But the interplay between science and business within the health domain became more mixed in the twentieth century as it became clear that with the virtual elimination of mortality linked to bacterial infections some of the greatest hazards to health came from pollution linked to new industries such as the lead and tobacco industries. Tackling the health problems that stem from important industries cannot expect to mobilize the same degree of community or political support when that effort risks being bad for the economy and business.
Matters were complicated by the fact that while acute heavy metal poisoning gives rise to straightforward medical disorders, and there are now drug treatments that can help manage this, chronic poisoning compromises functioning rather than produces a clear cut clinical syndrome and determining whether there is an issue needs epidemiological investigations whose results are rarely conclusive. The effects of pollution can be contested in a way that the existence of infections cannot.
In addition, the links industry developed with science in the nineteenth century left it well placed, and financially more able, to mount epidemiological studies in the twentieth century. This awareness of the benefits of research, along with greater resources to sponsor studies, was deployed to great effect, for instance, in the defence of cigarette smoking where industry demonstrated it had learnt to exploit the radical doubt that drives science. 
From Asylum Psychiatry to Social Psychiatry
Psychiatry came late to academia, but it had been the first medical discipline to have specialist hospitals and journals. While some have portrayed the emergence of asylums as instruments of social control, the asylum building programme was essentially a manifestation of progressive social activism, built on the same principles that underpinned the efforts of the sanitarians and Virchow -management of diet, encouragement of activity and avoidance of intoxicants.
Long before it became commonplace, Philippe Pinel was employed to give medical input to one of the earliest asylums the Salpetriere. He was the first to apply numerical methods in any kind of medicine. This exercise, in his hands, established the need for diagnosis within psychiatry. A great deal of what is now regarded as the medical apparatus within mental health came from him (Pinel 1809).
Where the hope of recovery had stimulated the opening of asylums, and while General Paralysis of the Insane and pellagra psychosis were later identified as preventable, by the late nineteenth century, the dominant theme in psychiatry was one that saw mental illness as an instance of degeneracy. The failure of asylum care to make much difference to the course of schizophrenia likely coloured such views.
By the start of the twentieth century, there was little that was social about psychiatry.
Its professoriate, mainly based in Germany, was largely neuropsychiatrically oriented.
Even the work of Sigmund Freud, which later contributed to an opening up of mental health to social issues, in the early twentieth century, located neurotic problems in the development of the individual rather than in exposure to the environment. Manual (DSM-I) in the United States. These developments were part of a move to develop metrics and to engage in the epidemiological surveys to map disorders and their triggers that were a necessary prelude to attempts to prevent mental illnesses.
In the early 1950's, the prospectus of social psychiatry adhered to the brief of public health medicine outlined by Kraepelin: "A psychiatry, having at its disposal statistics in their widest scope, must provide the foundations of a science of public mental health -a preventive psychological medicine for combating all those mischiefs that we group under the head of mental degeneracy". 8 8
Early epidemiological research pointed to a role of migration in causing mental disorders; both migration between countries and urban drift within a country.
A fall in suicide rates during the World Wars was taken to imply that social cohesion was an important factor in suicide. More generally, suicide and parasuicide, and evidence of variations in rates of both across cultures, between sexes and by age, also offered a basis for a traditional public health approach to the primary prevention of disorders.
There was a focus on the pace of social change as a cause of mental illness. This focus had historical antecedents from George Cheyne's linking The English Malady to development through to George Miller Beard and others blaming the pace of social development for an epidemic of neurasthenia in the late nineteenth century.
Efforts at primary prevention took standard social medicine approaches to identifying target populations and carriers. But rather than being confined to the reduction of exposures to alcohol, drug abuse and prostitution as previously, prospective mothers now became a key target population, and people who double bound others or otherwise communicated in distorted ways became key carriers. The emphasis was on social rather than physical vectors of illness.
By 1960, secondary prevention was also firmly on the map in the form of crisis intervention and community mental health programmes to shorten illness episodes.
But far from simply seeing the avoidance of admission as a way to reduce disability, there was a strand of the new thinking that looked to new settings operating on the principles underlying therapeutic communities and psychotherapy rather than on the basis of the "medical model". This new perspective linked to conceptual developments within the social sciences on the construction of identity and labelling theory in the work of Goffman and Scheff.
Finally, the 1950's brought the importance of institutionalization into the frame and this offered an opportunity for tertiary prevention and rehabilitation using standard social techniques to facilitate employment and enhance education.
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Meanwhile, epidemiological studies on schizophrenia in the 1960's pointed out that outcomes were worse in the West and that there were marked differences in the likelihood of a diagnosis of schizophrenia between the USA and other countries.
Other studies in the 1970's raised the question as to whether schizophrenia had only appeared in the nineteenth century. The writings of the asylum superintendents and meetings of alienists in the late nineteenth century were dominated by questions as to whether they were seeing a real increase in insanity with some arguing they were and others claiming there was no true increase.
These issues engaged social scientists, such as Andrew Scull, and brought concepts of medicalization and considerations of service utilization into play. The debates around this theme and around Freud's work helped bring the History of Psychiatry into being as a discipline.
But a set of studies initiated by Michael Shepherd on community nervous disorders that began reporting in the mid-1960's gave a pointer to future developments. These studies made clear that psychiatrists only saw a fraction of the psychic morbidity that could be detected in primary care.
Shepherd's work mapped the prevalence of disorders rather than sought to establish social factors contributing to disorders, or attempting to distinguish disorders that arise from without from those that arise within. This work laid the basis for the Epidemiological Catchment Area studies, which began in the USA but were later The new drugs turbo-charged the neurosciences. As this was happening, it became more difficult to distinguish between the medical discipline that was social psychiatry and a full-blown anti-psychiatry, which, claiming the oppression of the mad was a symbol for the oppression of all in the industrial democracies, made a significant contribution to the Revolutions of 1968.
Against the backdrop of antipsychiatry, there was a perceived need to pull the profession back from a mission to change the world to a focus on diseases located 11 11 within individuals rather than in social settings. The rhetoric stressed a return of psychiatry to its natural home within medicine.
There are many candidates for key moments that symbolized the transition. Many point to the publication of DSM-III in 1980, not realising this was an avowedly atheoretical exercise that was primarily an effort by an epidemiological movement within American psychiatry to corral psychoanalysis. The creators of the DSM (other than the St Louis Department who were on the margins of the exercise) bridled at the slur of Neo-Kraepelinians that was thrown at them.
Part of the difficulty psychiatry had gotten itself into, the newly dominant forces in the field asserted, stemmed from its abandonment of diagnosis. The problem with this formulation is that the metrics, epidemiology and operational criteria for diagnosis and the push to use these tools primarily arose from within social rather than biological psychiatry.
The point at which biological psychiatry was created came later. The best landmark is possibly a 1989 article by Sam Guze, the head of the St Louis Department, entitled simply, "Biological psychiatry: is there any other kind?" It was not the intention of the article to get anyone to identify themselves as a biological psychiatrist but that was one of the outcomes.
Guze's article coincided with the launch of the SSRIs and in very short order, it was in practice assumed that any entities within DSM-III, even adjustment and identity disorders, were biologically underpinned.
This biological underpinning brought the triumph of a language of lowered serotonin levels and chemical imbalances that picking up on an older language of neuroses and personality disorder, located psychiatric disorders within. The language of lowered serotonin had no more basis in biology than notions of degeneracy or the Freudian libido. A biobabble replaced a psychobabble.
In contrast to the notion of a neurosis, the heuristic concepts on the social side were that of a nervous breakdown and of an identity disorder. Even if breakdowns led to 12 prescriptions for tranquilisers, the disorders located under this heading were seen to some extent as stemming from social situations, such as the imprisonment of women in suburbia, or men in jobs selling products they didn't believe in.
There are a number of risks in a retreat from concepts of nervous breakdown.
One is that we will import social problems into biology. We might, for instance, end up regarding African-Americans as less intelligent or more prone to criminal behaviour than Caucasians, when for instance what we are dealing with are the consequences of lead poisoning in children living in slum housing, even if the hyperactivity caused by lead poisoning shows some response to stimulants.
Another lies in a scotoma for disorders that lie on the interface of the social and the biological. Even low levels of lead produce changes in haemoglobin, increased rates of hyperactivity and loss of intelligence. These are all biological changes arising from without; the complicating factor is that they are not classic disease states.
A third is that biologizing disorders within psychiatry has conferred a certain ahistoricity on them. While within mental health, changes in the prevalence of disorders (viz. neurasthenia, ADHD, Bipolar 2 Disorder) can stem from fashions, it is also the case that real diseases rise and fall in incidence and prevalence.
Historical research now makes it clear that rather like any infectious epidemic schizophrenia arose in the nineteenth century and may be disappearing. There are environmental changes that coincide with this rise and fall, such as concentrations of ambient lead and changes in obstetrical interventions that could plausibly have converted ordinarily remitting disorders, such as brief reactive psychoses, into chronic disorders.
It is even clearer that autistic spectrum disorders have emerged relatively recently and over four decades have become twenty times more prevalent than before. What are the triggers to these changes? 13
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Supposedly biological views claim a legitimacy on the basis of a certain invariance since Greco-Roman times for disorders like Manic-Depressive Illness. The failure of social (epidemiological) psychiatry to speak to these issues and to the disappearance of disorders like catatonia or post-partum psychosis is striking.
Even more striking was a venomous assessment of Kraepelin by Shepherd in 1995 that all but blamed him for the holocaust (Shepherd 1995) . The venom here was the equivalent of anything in the disputes between the bacteriologists and hygienists a century previously.
Social Psychiatry Rebadged
The term social psychiatry has vanished. But the discipline hasn't.
The According the annual report of Britain's Chief Medical Officer in 2014, however, Wellbeing researchers have been asking policy makers to take a leap of faith that pursuing a wellbeing agenda works and justifying this by claiming the medical model and biomedical reductionism doesn't fit into public mental health.
The approach, she has said, has made misleading claims for poor quality wellbeing research, while rebadging better quality psychiatric evidence as wellbeing evidence.
It has sought an opt-out from research rigour by claiming that wellbeing research is too important to be held to a high evidential standard, and has justified the minimal Even in this limited guise, however, Public Mental Health cannot avoid at some point facing the screening problems that will stem from the development of neuroimaging.
In the service of prevention, it is highly likely that a risk management perspective will at some point endorse neuro-imaging screening programs without evidence of benefit.
There is no evidence that the Public Mental Health movement has sufficient links to traditional Public Health that might enable it to temper any enthusiasm for screening of this type.
A prevention perspective will also lean toward the early identification of disorders in children. Where in the 1960's this was aimed at improving parenting skills, it is more likely now to lead to a great increase in psychotropic drug intake in children with noone able to work out how to disable a bandwagon that will be portrayed as evidence based. In the 1980's, a new movement took shape that was given a local habitation in the Cochrane Collaboration and a name -Evidence Based Medicine (EBM).
EBM is the ultimate triumph of the treatment of the average rather than the individual.
Betraying its origin within Public Health, EBM has an intense hostility to all things biological.
There are two looming points of confrontation. First, it is difficult to see how the changing incidence of problems like Autistic Spectrum Disorder will be understood by epidemiology alone. 
Big Pharma; Big Risk
Today, as has ever been the case, when a patient takes a problem to a doctor for help, the chances are that both the patient and the doctor locate themselves as lying somewhere between the surgical and public health poles of healthcare. Both expect the best of both traditions can be brought to bear on solving the problems the patient has.
Twenty-five years ago, doctor and patient lived in a world where medical issues were something that were found in journals, textbooks and a small number of popular medical and a somewhat larger number of popular books. A patient consulting today is likely to have a health story on the front page of their newspaper or internet media site, with an entire section devoted to health inside the paper, and an amount of health related material on the Web second only to pornography.
The political has become personal in an extraordinary fashion.
Unlike any time in medicine hitherto, today's patient has to take her place in a queue of people, many of whom have been summoned to a consultation by a clinic screening for a wide range of things, none of which bother patients, and a large proportion of those summoned will end up with diagnoses and on medication.
Today's patient has a doctor who adheres to guidelines as part of a mission to bring the best evidence to bear on her patients case, not recognizing she is being guided to see any problems in certain ways and deliver on patent treatments. Not recognizing her growing atomagnosia (inability to see the individual in front of her).
If the problem is a mental health one, both patient and doctor are likely to become aware of conversations denigrating biological reductionism claiming that it risks dehumanizing clinical encounters. In practice, however, biology contributes little or 18 18 nothing to clinical encounters about nervous problems. These encounters are being dehumanized but the problem lies with an informational reductionism linked to the use of rating scales and operational criteria.
Within the mental health domain, a great deal of public discourse claims the medical model is inappropriate, diagnosis unhelpful, and the word "patient" to be abjured along with an increasingly long string of replacement designations. But in practice, patients seek diagnoses, and the appeal of the language of chemical imbalances lay in the fact it was destigmatizing. The allure of biomedicine lies in its promise of treatments that work.
But for the first time in a century, today's first line treatments are likely to be less effective than yesterday's.
Within mental health, as in the rest of medicine, one of the greatest sources of morbidity and mortality now stems from the treatments patients have been put on by virtue of the risks inherent in those treatments, the multiplication of those risks by polypharmacy and the denial of the possibility of risks by corporations whose own health depends on the continuing consumption of the greatest possible number of medications by the greatest possible number of patients from the earliest possible age.
Epidemiological methods are used to deny treatment related risks. RCTs have become the gold-standard way to hide adverse events. These RCTs are taken to demonstrate cause and effect rather than the principles outlined by Koch of challenge, dechallenge and rechallenge. Were the dispute between Koch and von Pettenkoffer to be replayed today, Koch would likely lose.
Were Behring to discover a treatment worthy of a Nobel Prize today, unless the target population were sufficiently large to produce a considerable return on investment, the therapeutic lead would remain frozen in vitro rather than be planted in the womb of clinical practice -as all but happened 30 years ago with Barry Marshall's discovery of the benefits of antibiotics for ulcers.
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In the medical and lay media, Big Pharma is the whipping boy for these evils. But is it?
Economically it would seem to be in Big Risk's interests to map out the epidemiology of treatment induced morbidity but it doesn't. Big Risk's traditional methods of prevention -guidelines and RCTs -don't work for treatment-induced problems.
So uncertain has Big Risk made access to care that any suggestions that consuming fewer drugs might be healthier are drowned out for most people by concerns about access to medicines. The ACLU, for instance, will not take up the issue of whether treatment-induced violence might have led to inappropriate incarceration for fear it might complicate their efforts to ensure that prisoners have access to healthcare.
Just as a balance in drug development has tipped so that it no longer serves medical treatment, so also a balance within prevention has been perverted.
Big Risk should make it impossible for Big Pharma to take separate patents on drugs as similar as two drops of water, to ghost write over 90% of the literature for onpatent drugs and to sequester the data from clinical trials, in contravention of the fundamental norm of empirical science -but it doesn't.
Big Risk underpins a comprehensive failure to diagnose and treat in the face of morbidity and mortality on an epidemic scale.
Clinical practice is becoming degraded and there is an increasing need for clinicians to relearn the skills of listening to, seeing and touching patients. It will have to engage with a biology that recognizes the brain as a social organ rather than with biobabble.
It will have to shape an epidemiology that accepts you cannot design a proper controlled trial without understanding the biology being investigated. It will have to be able to take the dynamics of industrial power into account.
Until such treatment becomes possible, individual patients will be left shipwrecked
